Anonymous Tactics (from the attacks reported on by Imperva)

March 6, 2012 2 comments

I am also the editor of the Neohapsis Labs blog. The following is reprinted with permission from

http://labs.neohapsis.com/


by J. Schumacher

Security professionals have been following the collective of Internet users calling themselves Anonymous for a few years now as they cause cyber mayhem to understand their tactics.  There were two well written publications in recent weeks that caught my eye, The New York Times “In Attack on Vatican Web Site, a Glimpse of Hackers’ Tactics” and Imperva’s “Hacker Intelligence Summary Report, the Anatomy of an Anonymous Attack”.  These articles shed light on how Anonymous takes a call to arms, recruits members, and searches for action.  After reading these articles I kept thinking about current state of the Internet and wondering about the future of Anonymous’ with the cyber pandemonium it creates.

Taking the Imperva report as factual, the collective group of Anonymous has an approximate 10:1 ratio of laypeople to skilled hackers, which I believe limits the sophistication of attacks. I say “collective”, as targets for attacks are not often given from above, but must be approved or agreed upon by the masses before being launched.  One very interesting note in Imperva’s report was that the attacks Imperva monitored in 2011 were not utilizing bots, malware or phishing techniques for exploit, but end users actively running tools or visiting special web sites to aid in the attack.  There was a high level of public recruitment through social media of Twitter and Facebook, which can also act to inform the victim before the attack hits properly.

The New York Times article mentions that the attack on the Vatican took 18 days to gain enough recruitment and automated scanning tools were used for reconnaissance on the Vatican virtual front during this time.  In this attack Anonymous was seeking to interrupt the International Youth Day by a certain date, but when that failed Anonymous changed tactics to widespread distribution of software for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) so they could to hit the Vatican with a thousand person attack.  There were mixed statements from Anonymous and Imperva (who was a contractor for Internet security monitoring) regarding whether any sites across the globe were truly taken offline for any amount of time.

I think that Rob Rachwald, Imperva’s director of security, was quoted best by The New York Times article as saying “who is Anonymous?  Anyone can use the Anonymous umbrella to hack anyone at anytime”.  However, I believe Anonymous has currently reached their collective peak and will never be the same as in its early 4chan or even the 2008 days.  However, by no means has the world heard the last of Anonymous, as people will be claiming affiliation to the collective “group” for a very long to come, and I believe it will also continue to evolve over time.  How this change takes place is going to be exciting to see as Anonymous claims an “ideas without leaders” mentality and relies on general public for consensus of missions.

Recently, an interesting report from Symantec also came out about how Anonymous affiliates were tricked into installing the Zeus Trojan by a Pastebin tutorial covering how to install and use one of the attack tools, the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC), to support in DDoS attacks.  Established Twitter handles for Anonymous contributors (YourAnonNews, AnonymousIRC, AnonOps) have tweeted that this was not done by Anonymous. But, with no leadership accountable (due to the collective nature of Anonymous), there is nothing to say whether this is a true, whether another entity is sabotaging Anonymous public fanfare, or if it was simply someone taking advantage of free publicity to trick users into installing malware.  Since what many call the start of Anonymous in 2008 (Scientology attacks), there have not been any other large scale compromises of the those supporting attacks through infected tools, but this new activity could hurt the future of Anonymous recruitment and public support.

Depending on whether this recent instance of infected tools was a fluke, I see the future of Anonymous involving with skilled hackers increasing through a Wild West collaborative of honing their talents, while keeping the true base of Anonymous as largely unskilled hackers.  The skilled will, at times, directly and indirectly work for entities (such as large scale crime syndicates as well as private entities) to whom they are lured by big pay for work that will never be reported in any news paper.  The skilled hackers will still participate in Anonymous causes, and they will also enable other Anonymous members (through writing attack tools, scripts or apps), while also keeping knowledge of their well paid exploits limited to a smaller private offshoot group.  These offshoots will put dedication into advanced exploits that require some financial backing to set up (such as servers for social engineering, injection data repository, proxies and bots) but these exploits will most likely never be communicated to the larger Anonymous collective or used for social causes of the masses but rather private gains.

At the same time though, the unskilled hackers, making up the majority of the group, are essential to Anonymous at large for bringing attention and support to causes, identifying weaknesses in networks, performing DDoS attacks and being a overall distraction and crowd to hide in. It seems bots will be unnecessary and replaced by humans where it is simpler.  A large army that is not connected (outside of the odd one-off message to a public forums or social media) provides for a large pool that the authorities must sift through in finding the dedicated Anon.  The collective group of Anonymous has showed support for many social causes, like the occupy movement and free speech outcries from proposed Internet legislation.  At the same time Anonymous seems to have very publicly promoted every hack and breach that has been reported since 2010 whether the data exposed was government, private industry or public citizens.

I like to think of myself as a practical, but at times wishful, person.  As I see it, the core ideology of the Anonymous’ movement is not going away, as their cause is not so much new as is the platform for their disobedience.  There are some basic controls that organizations can implement to protect themselves from a virtual protest, whether the risk is from DDoS attacks or exploits of un-patched public devices.  In the near term, I do not see a high probability of Anonymous becoming a super group of hackers that perform sophisticated attacks in the likes of Stuxnet. Nor do I see the possibility of a large scale take down of critical infrastructure.  There will always be a risk and sometimes possible threats to critical infrastructure through technology but this risk can be largely mitigated through proper assessment and mitigating controls.

Side note –

If the recent instance of infected tools will continue on other causes then I believe we have seen the end of wide support for Anonymous.  Distrust has always been a concern to involved members with very recent arrests across the globe for LulzSec. Anonymous will need to do internal damage control to prevent the collapse of the collective group and a public distrust in support for causes brought up by the Anons.  Even if hacking group Anonymous goes in a different direct the damage has been done and Internet society can never reverse the damage physiologically from the last 5 years.

As writing this post there was news coming out that a prominent member of Anonymous, Sabu, along with 5 others have been arrested by the FBI.  We will have more details once the dust settles a bit and all news sources can be processed, stay tuned.

Getting your head around the “Mobile” discussion

The last time business managers were worked into a tizzy about “Mobile,” we called it Mobile Computing or Mobility and we talked about remote workers, laptop computers and USB memory sticks (thumb drives).  Organizations routinely provisioned employees with both, and employees routinely wanted to use their personal laptops and USB sticks for business use. Therefore, companies had to deal with a mix of business and personal mobile computing devices.  In those days Neohapsis recommended that its clients create strong “personal use” policies, promote awareness of the risks, and deploy technology measures to mitigate some those risks. Today’s mobile discussion is similar in theme but quite different in details.

Mobile no longer merely means mobile computing or mobile workforce.  Its common use now includes social networking, mobile websites, mobile apps, new messaging and communication platforms, photos, crowd sourcing, and videos used for personal and business reasons on a vast range of technologies including home PCs, corporate workstations, laptops, smartphones and tablets on the business network, the home Internet connection and in the Cloud.

The technology eco-system of Mobile is vast. Phones, cameras, PDAs (like the iPod Touch©), portable storage devices (external storage, iPods, memory sticks) and tablets are all included, but so are computers, servers and entire data centers.  The glue that connects all of these systems in the Mobile conversation is simply one thing: the Internet.  Mobile touches nearly every aspect of your IT environment.

So what does a business manager need to know in order to approach Mobile with reasonable security?  That is the subject of Neohapsis Labs’ newest paper: The Secure Mobile Enterprise. Download it here.

Categories: Uncategorized

Set and Don’t Forget

February 28, 2012 2 comments

I am also the editor of the Neohapsis Labs blog. The following is reprinted with permission from
http://labs.neohapsis.com/

By Patrick Harbauer, Neohapsis Senior Security Consultant and PCI Technical Lead

There are several PCI DSS requirements that are related to tasks that must be performed on a regular basis. The frequency of these tasks varies from daily to annual. There are also a few requirements that make it important to have PCI DSS compliant data retention policies and procedures in place. An example of a requirement that calls for a task to be performed periodically is requirement 11.2.2: Perform quarterly external vulnerability scans via an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV). An example of a requirement the calls for compliant data retention policies and procedures is requirement 9.4: Use a visitor log to maintain a physical audit trail of visitor activity. Retain this log for a minimum of three months, unless otherwise restricted by law. If processes or checklists are not in place to track your compliance with these reoccurring tasks, you may be in for an unpleasant surprise during your next annual ROC assessment.

Are You Certifiable?

11.2.2 is one of the classic requirements where we see this happen all too often. When we ask a customer if we can review the certified, passing ASV scans from the last four quarters and we get a response such as, “Oops, Susie was responsible for that and she was reassigned to a different department…” we stick our fingers in our ears and say “la la la la” but that hasn’t ever made the problem go away. Unfortunately, when this happens, instead of a 10 minute conversation reviewing 4 certified and passing ASV scans, we have to buy a few pizza’s, cross our fingers and review several external vulnerability scan reports in hopes that the customer can demonstrate they are scanning and remediating to meet the spirit and intent of requirement 11.2.2.

A Ruleset Only a Mother Could Love

We have seen some very ugly firewall rule sets. We do understand that the business must be able to function and exists to make as large a profit as possible – not to sing the praises of PCI. But as QSA’s, we do need to see six month firewall and router rule set reviews and evidence that the rule sets are being maintained with good hygiene. Maintaining clean and healthy firewall rule sets is similar to a good exercise regimen. If your doctor gives you a daily exercise program to maintain your health and you follow it in a haphazard fashion, your doctor is not going to be able to give you a good health report upon your next doctor’s visit. Similarly, you need a solid program in place to make sure that your firewall rule sets remain healthy and only allow the outbound and inbound network traffic that is actually needed and authorized. And let’s face it, automation is needed for most organizations to manage their firewall and router rule sets effectively. Fortunately there are several excellent solutions available on the market that give you the ability to manage your firewall and router rule sets. For example, these solutions can analyze your rule sets to find overlapping and redundant rules, rules that have not been used over that last X days or rules that allow “any” access – a big PCI no-no. They can also provide the change control mechanisms needed to make sure that changes to firewall rule sets are reviewed and approved by authorized individuals and are properly documented so that rule sets are closely and properly managed.

“The Matrix”

To assist you with making sure that your security program is giving proper attention to specific PCI requirements, we are providing the following two lists. These can be used to create a matrix, review your security operations and to correct any gaps that you may uncover. List 1 covers the frequency with which tasks must be performed related to specific PCI DSS requirements. List 2 shows data retention periods tied to specific requirements. With a little planning, you can keep your PCI compliance on track at all times and avoid unpleasant surprises when your friendly QSA shows up for your next ROC assessment!

List 1 – Recurring PCI Compliance Tasks

1.1.6 – Review firewall and router rule sets (Every 6 Months)

3.1.1 – Automatic or manual process for identifying and securely deleting stored cardholder data (Quarterly)

6.1 – All system components and software are protected from known vulnerabilities (Monthly)

6.6 – Address new threats and vulnerabilities for public-facing web applications (At least annually and after any changes)

8.5.5 – Remove/disable inactive user accounts (Quarterly)

9.5 – Review security of backup media storage location (Annually)

9.9.1 – Properly maintain inventory logs of all media and conduct media inventories (Annually)

10.6 – Review logs for all system components (Daily)

11.1 – Test for the presence of wireless access points and detect unauthorized wireless access points (Quarterly)

11.2.1 – Perform internal vulnerability scans (Quarterly)

11.2.2 – Perform external vulnerability scans via an Approved Scanning Vendor (Quarterly)

11.2.3 – Perform internal and external scans (After any significant change)

11.3 – Perform external and internal penetration testing (At least once a year and after any significant infrastructure or application upgrade or modification)

11.5 – Deploy file-integrity monitoring tools and perform critical file comparisons (Weekly)

12.1.2 – Perform and document a formal risk assessment (Annually)

12.1.3 – Review security policy and update when the environment changes (Annually)

12.2 – Develop daily operational security procedures (Daily)

12.6.1 – Educate personnel (Upon hire and at least annually)

12.6.2 – Require personnel to acknowledge that they have read and understand the security policy and procedures (Annually)

12.8.4 – Maintain a program to monitor service providers’ PCI DSS compliance status (Annually)

List 2 – Data Retention Periods

9.1.1 – Store video camera and/or controls mechanism log (3 months)

9.4 – Retain visitor logs (3 months)

10.7 – Retain audit trail history (1 year)

Categories: Information Security, PCI

Pass the iOS Privacy Salt – Hashing Does NOT Guarantee Privacy.

February 15, 2012 11 comments

I am also the editor of the Neohapsis Labs blog. The following is reprinted with permission from
http://labs.neohapsis.com/

By Michael Pearce, Neohapsis & Neolabs

There has been a lot of concern and online chatter about iPhone/mobile applications and the private data that some send to various parties. Starting with the discovery of Path sending your entire address book to their servers, it has since also been revealed that other applications do the same thing. The other offenders include Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Foursquare, Foodspotting, Yelp, and Gowalla. This corresponds nicely with some research I have been doing into device ID leakage on mobile devices, where I have seen the same leakages, excuses, and techniques applied and abused as those discussed around the address book leakages.

I have observed a few posts discussing the issues proposing solutions. These solutions range from requiring iOS to request permission for address book access (as it does for location) and advising developers to hash sensitive data that they send through and compare hashes server side.

The first idea is a very good one, I see few reasons a device geolocation is less sensitive than its address book. The second one as given by is only partial advice however, and if taken as it is given in Martin May’s post, or Matt Gemmel’s arguments;  it will not solve the privacy problems on its own. This is because 1. anonymised data isn’t anonymous, and 2. no matter what hashing algorithm you use, if the input material is sufficiently constrained you can compute, or precompute all possible values.

Martin May’s two characteristics of a hash [link] :

  • Identical inputs will yield the same hash
  • It is virtually impossible to deduce the original input from a hash if a strong hashing algorithm is used.

This is because, of these two characteristics of a hash the privacy implications of first are not fully discussed, and the second is incorrect as stated.

 Hashing will not solve the privacy concerns because:

  • Hashing Data does not Guarantee Privacy (When the same data is input)
  • Hashing Data does not Guarantee Secrecy (When the input values are constrained)

The reasons not discussed for this are centered on the fact that real world input is constrained, not infinite. Telephone numbers are an extreme case of this, as I will discuss later.

A quick primer on hashing

Hashing is a destructive, theoretically one-way process where some data is taken and put through an algorithm to produce some output that is a shadow of the input. Like a shadow, the same output is always produced by the same input, but not the other way around. (Same car, same shadow).

A very simple example of a hashing function is the modulus (or remainder). For instance the output from 3 mod 2 is the remainder when 3 is divided by 2, or 1. The percent sign is commonly used in programming languages to denote this operation, so similarly

                1 % 3 is 1,             2 % 3 is 2              3 % 3 is 0              4 % 3 is 1              5 % 3 is 2       etc

If you take some input, you get the same output every time from the same hashing function. The reason the hashing process is one way is because it intentionally discards some data about the original. This results in what are called collisions, and we can see some in our earlier example using mod 3, 1 and 4 give the same hash, as do 2 and 5. The example given will cause collisions approximately one time in 1, however modern strong hashing functions are a great deal more complex than modulo 3. Even the “very broken” MD5 has collisions occur only one time in every 2^24 or 1 in ~17 000 000.

A key point is that, with a hashing algorithm for any output there are theoretically an infinite number of inputs that can give it and thus it is a one-way, irreversible, process.

A second key point is that any input gives the same output every time. So, by checking if the hashes of two items are the same you can be pretty sure they are from the same source material.

Cooking Some Phone Number Hash(es)

(All calculations are approximate, if I’m not out by two orders of magnitude then…)

Phone numbers conform to a rather well known format, or set of formats. A modern GPU can run about 20 million hashes per second (2*10^7), or 1.7  trillion (1.7 *10 11) per day. So, how does this fit with possible phone numbers?

A pretty standard phone number is made up of 1-3 digits for a country code, 3 local code, and 7 numbers, with perhaps 4 for the extension.

So, we have the following range of numbers:

0000000000000-0000 to 9999999999999-0000

Or, 10^13 possible numbers… About 60 days work to compute all possible values (and a LOT of storage space…)

If we now represent it in a few other forms that may occur to programmers…

+001 (234) 567-8910, 0012345678910, 001-234-5678910, 0012345678910(US), 001(234)5678910

We have maybe 10-20 times that, or several year’s calculations…

But, real world phone numbers don’t fill all possible values. For instance, take a US phone number. It is also made up of the country code, 3 for the local code , and 7 numbers, with perhaps 4 for the extension. But:

  • The country code is known:
  • The area code is only about 35% used since only 350 values are in use
  • The 7 digit codes are not completely full (let’s guess 80%)
  • Most numbers do not use extensions (let’s say 5% use them

Now, we only have 350 * (10 000 000 *.8) * 1.05 or 2.94 billion combinations (2.94*10^9). That is only a little over two minutes on a modern GPU. Even allowing for different representations of numbers you could store that in a few of gigabytes of RAM for instant lookup, or recalculate every time and take longer. This is what is called a time space tradeoff, the space of the memory or the time to recalculate.

Anyway, the two takeaways for our discussion here regarding privacy are:

1. Every unique output value probably corresponds to a unique input value, so this hashing anonymisation still has privacy concerns.

Since possible phone numbers are significantly fewer than the collision chance of even a broken hashing algorithm there is probably little chance of collisions.

2. Phone numbers can be reverse computed from raw hashes alone

Because of the known constraints of input values It is possible to either brute force reverse values, or to build a reasonable sized rainbow table on a modern system.

Hashing Does NOT Guarantee Privacy

Anonymising data by removing specific user identifying information but leaving in unique identifiers does not work to assuage privacy concerns. This is because often clues are in the data, or in linkages between the data. AOL learned this the hard way when they released “anonymised” search data.

Furthermore, the network effect can reveal a lot about you, how many people you connect to, and how many they connect to can be a powerful identifier of you. Not to mention predict a lot of things like your career area and salary point (since more connections tends to mean richer).

For a good discussion of some of the privacy issues related to hashes see Matt Gemmell’s post, Hashing for Privacy in social apps.

Mobile apps also often send the device hardware identifier (which cannot be changed or removed) to servers and advertising networks. And I have also observed the hash of this (or the WiFi MAC address) sent through. This hardly helps accomplish anything, as anyone who knows the device ID can hash it and look for that, and anyone who knows the hash can look for it, just as with the phone numbers. This hash is equally unique to my device, and unable to be changed.

Hashing Does not equal Secrecy

As discussed under “cooking some hash(es)” it is possible to work back from a hash to the input since we know some of the constraints operating upon phone numbers. Furthermore, even if we are not sure exactly how you are hashing data then we can simply put test data in and look for known hashes of it. If I know what 123456789 hashes to and I see it in the output, then I know how your app is hashing phone numbers.

The Full Solution to Privacy and Secrecy: Salt

Both of these issues can be greatly helped by increasing the complexity of the input into the hash function. This can both remove the tendency for anonymised data to carry identical identifiers across instances, and also reduce the chance of it becoming feasible to reverse-calculate all possible values. Unfortunately there is no perfect solution to this if user-matching functionality comes first.

The correct solution as it should be used to store passwords, entry specific salting (for example with bcrypt),  is not feasible for a matching algorithm as it will only work for comparing hashed input to stored hashes, and it will not work for comparing stored hashes to stored hashes.

However, if you as a developer are determined to make a server side matching service for your users, then you need to apply a hybrid approach. This is not good practice for highly sensitive information, but it should retain the functionality needed for server side matching.

Your first privacy step is to make sure your hashes do not match those collected or used by anyone else, do this by adding some constant secret to them, a process called salting.

e.g., adding 9835476579080945368095468905486 to the start of every number before you hash

This will make all of your hashes different to those used by any other developer, but will still compare them properly. The same input will give the same output.

However, there is still a problem – If your secret salt is leaked or disclosed the reversing attacks outlined earlier become possible. To avoid this, increase the complexity of input by hashing more complex data. So, rather than just hashing the phone number, hash the name, email, and phone number together. This does introduce the problem of causing hashes to disagree if any part of the input differs by misspelling, typo’s etc…

The best way to protect your user’s data from disclosure, and your reputation from damage due to a privacy breach:

  • Don’t collect or send sensitive user data or hashes in the first place – using the security principle of least privilege.
  • Ask for access in a very obvious and unambiguous way – informed consent.

Hit me/us up on twitter ( @neohapsis or @secvalve) if you have any comments or discussion. (Especially if I made an error!)

[Update] Added author byline and clarified some wording.

Who owns and regulates MY Facebook data?

February 14, 2012 19 comments

I am also the editor of the Neohapsis Labs blog. The following is reprinted with permission from

http://labs.neohapsis.com/

My previous post briefly described the data that makes up a user’s Facebook data and this post will try to shed light on who owns and regulates this data.

I am probably not going out on a limb here to say that the majority of Facebook’s registered users have not read the privacy statement. I was like the majority of users myself, in that I did not fully read Facebook’s privacy statement upon signing up for the service. Facebook created a social media network online, and there were few requirements previously defined for such types of business in America or the world. A lack of rules, combined with users constantly uploading more data, has allowed Facebook to maximize the use of your data and create a behemoth of a social media networking business.

Over time, Facebook has added features to allow users to self regulate their data by limiting others (whether Facebook users or general Internet public) from viewing certain data that one might want to share with only family or specific friends. This provided a user with the sense of ownership and privacy as the creator of the data could block or restrict friends and search providers from viewing their data. Zuckerberg is even quoted by WSJ as saying “The power here is that people have information they don’t want to share with everyone. If you give people very tight control over what information they are sharing or who they are sharing with they will actually share more. One example is that one third of our users share their cell phone number on the site”.

In addition to privacy controls, Facebook gave users more insight into their data through a feature that allowed a user to download ‘all’ their data through a button in the account settings. I placed ‘all’ in quotes because, while you could download your Facebook profile data, this did not include data including wall comments, links, information tagged by other Facebook users or any other data that you created during your Facebook experience. Combined, privacy controls and data export are the main forms of control that Facebook gives to their users for ownership of profile, pictures, notes, links, tags and comment data since Facebook went live in 2004.

So now you might be thinking problem solved; restricting your privacy settings on the viewing of information and downloading ‘all’ your information fixes everything for you. Well, I wish that was the case with Facebook business operations. An open letter by 10 Security professionals to the US Congress highlighted that this was not simply the way things worked with Facebook and third party Facebook developer’s operations. Facebook has reserved the right to change their privacy statement at any time with no notice to the user and Facebook has done this a few times, to an uproar from their user base. As Facebook has grown in popularity and company footprint, security professionals along with media outlets have started publishing security studies painting Facebook in a darker light.

As highlighted by US Congress in December 2011, Facebook was not respecting user’s privacy when sharing information to advertisers or when automatically enabling contradicting privacy settings on new services to their users.  Facebook settled with the US Congress on seven charges of deceiving the user by telling them they could keep their data private.  From my perspective it appears that Facebook is willing to contradict their user’s privacy to suit their best interest for shareholders and business revenue.

In additional privacy mishaps, Facebook was found by an Austrian student to be storing user details even after a user deactivates the service. This started an EU versus Facebook initiative over the Internet that put heat on Facebook to give more details on length of time data was being retained for current and deactivated users.  Holding on to user data is lucrative for Facebook as this allows them to claim more users in selling to advertising subscribers as well as promoting the total user base for private investor bottom lines.

So the next step one might ask is “who regulates my data held by social media companies?” Summed up quickly today, no one outside Facebook is regulating your data and little insight is given to users on this process. The governments of the US, along with the European Union, are looking at means of regulating Facebook’s operations using things such as data privacy regulations and the US/EU Safe Harbor Act.  With Facebook announcing their initial public offering of five billion USD there is soon to be more regulations, at least financially, to hit Facebook in the future.

As an outcome of the December 2011 investigation by the United States Congress, Facebook has agreed to independent audits by third parties, presumably of their choosing. I have not been able to identify details regarding the subject of these audits or ramifications for findings from an audit. Facebook has also updated the public statement and communication to developers and now states that deactivated users will have accounts deleted after 30 days. I have yet to see a change in Facebook’s operations for respecting their user’s privacy settings when pertaining to third parties and other outside entities – in fairness they insist data is not directly shared for advertising; although some British folks may disagree with Facebook claims of advertising privacy.

From an information security perspective, my ‘free’ advice to businesses, developers and end users, do not accesses or give more data than necessary for your user experience as this only brings trouble in the long run. While I would like to give Facebook the benefit of the doubt in their operations, I personally only give data that I am comfortable sharing with the world even though it is limited to friends.  In global business data privacy regulations vary significantly between countries, with regulations come requirements and everyone knows that failing requirements results to fines so business need to think about only access appropriate information and accordingly restricting access.  For the end user, or Facebook’s product, remember that Facebook can change their privacy statement at their leisure and Facebook is ultimately a business with stakeholders that are eager to see quarter after quarter growth.

I hope this post has been insightful to you; please check back soon for my future post on how your Facebook data is being used and the different entities that want to access your data.

Anonymous Releases FBI and UK Conference Call Recording

February 5, 2012 1 comment

I am also the editor of the Neohapsis Labs blog. The following is reprinted with permission from
http://labs.neohapsis.com/

This past Friday (February 3, 2012) Anonymous released a call recording regarding an assumed confidential conference call between two FBI field offices and a official UK investigation office regarding status on Anonymous, AntiSec, Lulzsec and other splinter cyber groups.  It was released on ThePirateBay, YouTube and Pastebin, and  from the Pastebin posts, the conference call appears to have been related to a meeting invite for a call on January 17, 2012 that was sent on January 13, 2012 to nearly 50 people from France, UK, Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Sweden and hosted by US to coordinate internationally.  The posts were made by anonymous as part of their #FFF (F@$K FBI Friday) releases which has been going on almost regularly for over a year now.

It is unclear through YouTube audio if the call was from January 20, or a more recent conference call between the governments.  I think that this was probably only released because the hacking groups found no more use in that bridge number.  In listening to the call, one can gain insight into the global workings of the fight against cyber crime, as two current cases were lightly discussed. Insight was also sought regarding other persons of interest concerning breaches reported to government authorities.  I found the lack of care around people joining the call interesting as I could hear the extra beep that was missed by the call parties and I assume it was ‘Anonymous’ recording the call.

Few facts can be gathered around how anonymous gained the electronic invitation for the meeting.  After the Pastebin post with conference bridge call number and password, it does not seem that the conference system or software was hacked to gain access for the call.  One might assume that an email account or system on the distribution list could have been compromised to gain the conference details or some form of social engineering was used in the attack.  Either way, anonymous has again provided a reason for government and private industry to rethink their communication processes for distributing sensitive call meetings.  In future calls, I would think that every time the system beeps for a new attendee on the call there will be a stop to ask who had just joined the conference, especially when discussing active investigations or sensitive information.

While there is a need to share passwords for conference calls it is important to mitigate any risk in the process to overcome the shared password.  Typically this is done on conference calls by paying a very close attention to people joining the call and stopping conversation when the system makes a beep for a new participant joining the call.  If the conference call is of sensitive or classified information then the call should be halted or stopped if all parties are not able to be identified on the conference system.

Also, all parties need to read The New York Times article about board rooms being open up to hackers through weak implementation security as it has some relevance here.

Categories: Information Security

Groundhog Day in the Application Security World

February 1, 2012 2 comments

I am also the editor of the Neohapsis Labs blog. The following is reprinted with permission from
http://labs.neohapsis.com/

By Michael Pearce, a Security Consultant and Researcher at Neohapsis

Throughout the US on Groundhog Day, an inordinate amount of media attention will be given to small furry creatures and whether or not they emerge into bright sunlight or cloudy skies. In a tradition that may seem rather topsy-turvy to those not familiar with it, the story says that if the groundhog sees his shadow (indicating the sun is shining), he returns to his hole to sleep for six more weeks and avoid the winter weather that is to come.

Similarly, when a company comes into the world of security and begins to endure the glare of security testing, the shadow of what they find can be enough to send them back into hiding. However, with the right preparation and mindset, businesses can not only withstand the sight of insecurity, they can begin to make meaningful and incremental improvements to ensure that the next time they face the sun the shadow is far less intimidating.

Hundreds or thousands of issues – Why?

It is not uncommon for a Neohapsis consultant to find hundreds of potential issues to sort through when assessing a legacy application or website for the first time. This can be due to a number of reasons, but the most prominent are:

  1. Security tools that are paranoid/badly tuned/misunderstood
  2. Lack of developer security awareness
  3. Threats and technologies have evolved since the application was designed/deployed/developed

Security Tools that are Paranoid/Badly Tuned/Misunderstood

Security testing and auditing tools, by their nature, have to be flexible and able to work in most environments and at various levels of paranoia. Because of this, if they are not configured and interpreted with the specifics of your application in mind they will often find a large number of issues, of which the majority are noise that should be ignored until the more important issues are fixed. If you have a serious, unauthenticated, SQL injection that exposes plain-text credit card and payment details, you probably shouldn’t a moment’s thought stressing about whether your website allows 4 or 5 failed logins before locking an account.

Lack of Developer Security Awareness

Developers are human (at least in my experience!), and have all the usual foibles of humanity. They are affected by business pressures to release first and fix bugs later, with the result that security bugs may be de-prioritized down as “no-one will find that” and so “later” never comes. Developers also are often taught about security as an addition rather than a core concept. For instance, when I was learning programming, I was first taught to construct SQL strings and verbatim webpage output and only much later to use parameterized queries and HTML encoding. As a result, even though I know better, I sometimes find myself falling into bad practices that could introduce SQL injection or cross-site scripting, as the practices that introduce these threats come more naturally to me than the secure equivalents.

Threats and Technologies have Evolved Since the Application was Designed/Deployed/Developed

To make it even harder to manage security, many legacy applications are developed in old technologies which are either unaware of security issues, have no way of dealing with them, or both. For instance, while SQL injection has been known about for around 15 years, and cross-site scripting a little less than that, some are far more recent, such as clickjacking and CSS history stealing.

When an application was developed without awareness of a threat, it is often more vulnerable to it, and when it was built on a technology that was less mature in approaching the threat remediating the issues can be far more difficult. For instance, try remediating SQL injection in a legacy ASP application by changing queries from string concatenation to parameterized queries (ADODB objects aren’t exactly elegant to use!).

Dealing with issues

Once you have found issues, then comes the daunting task of prioritizing, managing, and preventing their reoccurrence. This is the part that can bring the shock, and the part that can require the most care, as this is a task in managing complexity.

The response to issues requires not only looking at what you have found previously, but also what you have to do, and where you want to go. Breaking this down:

  1. Understand the Past – Deal with existing issues
  2. Manage the Present – Remedy old issues, prevent introduction of new issues where possible
  3.  Prepare for the Future – Expect new threats to arise

Understand the Past – Deal with Existing Issues

When dealing with security reports, it is important to always be psychologically and organizationally prepared for what you find. As already discussed, this is often unpleasant and the first reactions can lead to dangerous behaviors such as overreaction (“fire the person responsible”) or disillusionment (“we couldn’t possibly fix all that!”). The initial results may be frightening, but flight is not an option, so you need to fight.

To understand what you have in front of you, and to react appropriately, it is imperative that the person interpreting the results understands the tools used to develop the application; the threats surrounding the application; and the security tool and its results. If your organization is not confident in this ability, consider getting outside help or consultants (such as Neohapsis) in to explain the background and context of your findings.

 Manage the present – Remedy old issues, prevent introduction of new issues where possible

Much like any software bug or defect, once you have an idea of what your overall results mean you should start making sense of them. This can be greatly aided through the use of a system (such as Neohapsis Security Manager) which can take vulnerability data from a large number of sources and track issues across time in a similar way to a bug tracker.

Issues found should then be dealt with in order of the threat they present to your application and organization. We have often observed a tendency to go for the vulnerabilities labeled as “critical” by a tool, irrespective of their meaning in the context of your business and application. A SQL injection bug in your administration interface that is only accessible by trusted users is probably a lot less serious than a logic flaw that allows users to order items and modify the price communicated and charged to zero.

Also, if required, your organization should rapidly institute training and awareness programs so that no more avoidable issues are introduced. This can be aided by integrating security testing into your QA and pre-production testing.

 Prepare for the future – Expect new threats to arise

Nevertheless, even if you do everything right, and even if your developers do not introduce any avoidable vulnerabilities, new issues will probably be found as the threats evolve. To detect these, you need to regularly have security tests performed (both human and automated), keep up with the security state of the technologies in use, and have plans in place to deal with any new issues that are found.

Closing

It is not unusual to find a frightening degree of insecurity when you first bring your applications into the world of security testing, but diving back to hide is not prudent. Utilizing the right experience and tools can turn being afraid of your own shadow into being prepared for the changes to come. After all, if the cloud isn’t on the horizon for your company then you are probably already immersed in it.

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